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Introduction

Hegelian Organisations

In the past decade or so as organisations have become
intensively technologically based, it is becoming
increasingly apparent that technological change alone
does not guarantee success for an organisation. Courtney
et al (1997) and Croasdell et al (1998) have suggested that
Churchman’s models of Inquiring Systems are crucial for
the design of effective learning in organisations. A clear
feature of Inquiring Systems is their revival of the
necessity for seeing organisations in terms of learning
sub-systems. The learning sub-system, if it is a learning
sub-system within an Inquiring System, is the learning
culture that the organisation creates and fosters for itself.
The development of a culture is a fragile creation. One of
the central points of Inquiring Systems is the distinct
recognition that technology alone cannot succeed in
dominating a learning culture; the culture would simply
disintegrate. In varying degrees then, any attempted
technological domination would fragment and inhibit the
development of a learning culture. It is rather the case that
technology needs to be integrated into the organisational
learning culture. The design possibilities within such a
learning culture are “an enormous liberation of the
intellectual spirit” (Churchman, 1971, p 13). The
alternative - and perhaps to some, not so obvious on the
surface - in a technology dominated environment, is the
stifling of intellectual spirit. More specifically, in C. West
Churchman’s work, we find an explication of five
learning cultures or five archetypal models. This paper is
concerned with the Hegelian Inquiring System. In G.W.F.
Hegel’s published works we find many of the intellectual
seeds which, for example, Heidegger, as one recognised
and celebrated example of a phenomenologist, sought out
and incorporated into his (Heidegger’s) phenomenology.

The essence of the Hegelian Inquiring System within
an organisation is the development, or better, the
emergence, of the idea of the synthesis of Hegelian
“objectivity” as an outcome of the organisation members’
various perspectives. As Churchman says (Churchman,
1971, p149),
Kant seemed to have thought that objectivity
occurs when the experience is shaped into a
“general object”, i.e., gains its form and
intelligibility from space, time, and the
categories. But even this shaping of experience is
not enough ... We also need to design into the
inquirer an ability to see the “same” object from
different points of view ... we need to develop
the additional idea of an “object” as a collection
of interconnected observations in which each
observer can examine how another observer
views the world. The “objectivity” of experience
is to be based on some kind of interconnection of
observers.
The upshot of the above passage is that there needs to
be a synthesis of “different points of view”. In other
words, there needs to be a perspective on the perspective
that others bring to bear upon an object, in this case, an
organisation or, at the very least elements within an
organisation. It is the perspective of a perspective, or the
development of the observation of individual observations
that leads to the emergence of an Hegelian learning
culture. The more it is a genuine synthesis, the more the
learning culture becomes an Hegelian Inquiring System.
But it is clear, at least to phenomenologists, and
transparently clear to Hegel, that objectivity cannot
emerge by itself. There needs to be a “subject” and that
subject needs to be reconciled AS an object. In the forty
five page “Preface: On Scientific Cognition” to Hegel’s
work The Phenomenology of Spirit, (Hegel, 1977, p 37)
we find such a clear recognition when Hegel speaks of
speculative thinking:

This paper does not explore the groundwork
connection between Hegel and Heidegger to any great
extent. However it is concerned with examining some of
the phenomenological aspects within the Hegelian
Inquiring System which have been explored by
Churchman himself, and to what extent such aspects can
be extended.

633

Speculative [begreifendes] thinking behaves in a
different way. Since the Notion is the subject’s
own Self, which represents itself as the comingto-be of the object, it is not a passive Subject
inertly supporting the Accidents: it is, on the
contrary, the Self-moving Notion which takes its
determinations back into itself. In this movement
the passive Subject itself perishes; it enters into
the differences and the content, and constitutes
the determinateness, i.e. the differentiated
content and its movement, instead of remaining
inertly over against it. The solid ground which
argumentation has in the passive Subject is
therefore shaken, and only this movement itself
becomes the object.

sights for “objectivism” is the British Empiricist, but
Churchman reserves the most trenchant criticism for the
“subjectivists” encapsulated in his dry comment:
“Subjectivism is a very weak philosophy with very strong
implications” (Churchman, 1971, p 152). Indeed either a
purely objectivist or purely subjectivist stance has severe
limitations as phenomenology well recognises.

Mechanistic Objectivity
Churchman clearly recognises the mechanist’s
misconstruction of objectivity. To the mechanist (or
reductionist) sentences that describe an object are
somehow construed as its essence! Or, for example, the
relationships that arise in relation to a sales product of an
organisation (who buys it; where it is sold; how best to
market it) in some way defines that product. Or, opinions
that describe an object somehow are taken to constitute
that object. Furthermore, quantitative measures of
performance, once set in place become a way of defining
(more than) the performance of an organisation employee.
In all of these cases, there is no sense of the Self
interacting with that object; any so-called interaction is
always via another self or pseudo-self. The Self
interaction is not so much indirect, but rather by degree
absent, and hence alienated. Of course there will be
degrees of alienation, but the extent of the absence of Self
interaction with an object will be the extent of the
alienation. It should be noted that all of these quantitative
factors are important if not crucial to fact gathering for an
organisation, but they are only facts; they are only a
collection of discrete pieces of information, none of
which collectively can account for the essence of what is
being considered. It is the relationship of the Self to the
object that brings out that full essential potential.
Accordingly mechanists are alienated from the true
contribution of an object. In other words in a managerial
setting dominated by mechanistic considerations, there is
a great limitation placed on the potential expansiveness of
an object, whether that object be a product, an employee,
an event or a relationship of any kind. The mechanist is
dominated by the fact, simply because s/he has no sense
of the true relationship between subject and object.
Churchman sums up this position as follows (Churchman,
1971, p 160),

Churchman also recognised the need to reconcile the
subject with the object, hence indicating Churchman’s
recognition of a phenomenological perspective. This is
clear in the following passage, (Churchman 1971, p 158),
Suppose we say, as Hegel did, that the process
by which one mind observes another is selfreflection (or self-consciousness), recognising
that this old-fashioned term is both practical and
common in its meaning here. Managerial control
in a firm is a self-conscious process. ... Suppose
we call the mind that is being observed the
“subject” and the observing mind the
“observer”? The inquiring system that we shall
examine is the “observer-of-the-subject”.
In other words, Churchman clearly recognises the
need for a - phenomenological - subject-as-object
approach. For Churchman, the observation of the
objectivity of the observed is referred to as the “subject”,
and the subject, who is observing, is referred to as the
“observer”. It is of no consequence that Churchman calls
what is normally referred to as an object, “the subject”,
while referring to the subject observer as “observer”. This
is so because in the final analysis the subjectivity of the
observer and the objectivity of what is being observed
(the Churchmanian, “subject”) is reconciled in what
Churchman refers to as the “observer-of-the-subject”. It is
profoundly clear that Churchman (Churchman, 1971, p
158) recognised the implications of such a reconciliation
when he says, “That a subject is having an objective
experience is a subjective experience of the observing
mind… Self-reflection is a necessary condition for
objectivity, but not a sufficient one.” In other words it is
always a subject-as-object experience, but not object-assubject. This is very much a phenomenological stance. In
his analysis of the Hegelian Inquiring System Churchman
also recognised the limitations of being either purely an
objectivist or purely a subjectivist. The classic example he

He [the mechanist] may wish ever so ardently
that men love their fellow men, but when the
facts reveal that men hate each other instead,
then the inquirer must bow to the authority of
fact. In this mechanist relationship man becomes
the slave of the master who is information.
Accordingly it is easy to see why humans are
dominated by technology, this is simply because they
have no learning culture out of which to make judgements
for themselves and for others in order to make a
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perspectival placement of technology. In the Hegelian
Inquiring System, humans can place technology into
perspective because the learning culture of the dialectical
reconciliation of subject and object is fostered,
encouraged and explored for all its potential.

I’ve found that the design of such conversations
[between thought and wisdom] has been very
helpful to me in learning about an area of
concern, much more helpful than the dialectical
conversations I designed earlier [in The Design
of Inquiring Systems] which turned out to be too
rational.

The Organisational Teleological Potential of
the Hegelian Inquiring System

Summary

Churchman makes the point (Churchman, 1971, p
163) that “the teleological approach to information in
keeping with the dialectical approach of an Hegelian
Inquiring System – emphasizes purpose (means and
ends)”. But Churchman goes on to say that the
teleological basis of information policy fails to solve the
problem of authority, and rather, as he says, postulates a
new question as to whether the master (the organisational
management) can be trusted. I think this is to take too
literal an interpretation of Hegel’s master slave dialectic.
A more thoroughgoing phenomenological appreciation of
Hegel’s work would suggest that the question of trust is
always implicit in a culture of learning; see the “Semco
Experience”, (Sembler, 1994). It is implicit because the
trust is shared by the members as a collective recognition
and respect for each other’s dedication to their various
specialties of learning within the organisation.
Churchman lays the foundation for my previous comment
in his section “The Subject As a Manager” (note the use
of the hermeneutic “As”) in the statement “.. if it is the
subject after all who uses teleological considerations to
appoint the master observer-of-the-subject, then the
alienation seems to disappear” (Churchman, 1971, pp
163, 164). As we enter the new millenium we are rapidly
moving into collectives of specialists. The question is,
will those collectives be formed into cohesive groups as
communities, or will they fragment and lose the potential
for being a culture of learning? In the Hegelian Inquiring
System a culture of learning synthesises its contribution to
the organisation out of the opposition of conflicting ideas
within the group of specialists. The literal question of who
is the manager ceases to be of importance, because the
function of the manager under an Hegelian Inquiring
System is to monitor the contribution of the group. The
manager thus functions as the synthesiser. Hence, the
question of authority is purely the – and the necessarily
welcomed – authority of the subject-matter of the
specialists. It is also interesting to note that the notion of
the dialectic in Churchman’s Hegelian Inquiring System
should not be taken literally, especially in the rational or
logical sense of two opposing forces reconciling
themselves together. One needs to appreciate the nonlogical side of Hegel’s dialectic (non-logical does not
mean illogical). Churchman himself – in part – recognised
this in a comment he directed to his own work on Hegel’s
Inquiring System, that is found in a later work Churchman
published entitled Thought and Wisdom. Churchman said
(Churchman, 1982, p 61):

Effective learning in an organisation has been
explored from the perspective of a learning culture (see
also Haynes, (Haynes, 1999), in relation to the notion and
the perspective of an organisational culture). This paper
has argued that the nature of a learning culture finds its
expression in the Hegelian Inquiring System as articulated
by C. West Churchman. By digging deeper into the
Hegelian contribution we find phenomenological aspects
which provide for a more fuller articulation of the nature
of a learning culture. It is recommended that in order to
cope with the explosion of specialists as we rapidly move
into the 21st century it is critical for organisations to
become effective learning organisations and accordingly
understand and nurture their own learning cultures.
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